[ILUG] E-voting in India
Bryan O'Donoghue
bryano at europlex.ie
Wed May 5 12:51:00 IST 2004
> There is no need to compromise beyond that, we do not need to degrade
> trust. There is no reason why we cannot take the advantages of E-voting
> (harder to mistakenly spoil a ballot, better accsessiblity) and combine
> it with what we know - paper counts.
A paper count is a step in the right direction.
However, in order to stress the Close Source system, one has to perform a paper
count in tandem. At this point we can know or at least hazard a better guess as
to the likelyhood of a backdoors existing in a given system.
Perhaps that backdoors exists, but, wasn't used in that particular instance to
compromise the voting process.
My position would be that, unless I as a citizen can verify that code, I can't
be satisfied that the system *isn't* compromised.
A paper trail is a necessity, but, I also would contend, so is the ability to
scrutanise the source code.
Why shouldn't the source code be available to the public?
A foreign company has *no* rights afforded to citizens in this country, it is a
vendor, supplying a public service and it's ethereal Intellectual Property
rights, have no remit to degrade or abrogate a citizens right to verify *all*
aspects of a democratic vote.
With aspects of the voting system performed behind closed doors, the ability
for an new angle of deceit is introduced. This is a necessary area of paranoia
and complacency in areas like this, have a tendency to bite one in the rear end
with veracity.
What that is, is a retrograde step from the voter verification process we have
now, and that's completely unacceptable.
--
Bryan O'Donoghue
Embedded Software Engineer
Europlex Technologies Ltd
Clonshaugh Business & Technology Park
Dublin 17
Ireland
T:+353 (0) 1 2500500
F:+353 (0) 1 2500590
E:bryano at euoplex.ie
W:www.europlex.ie
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