[ILUG] E-voting in India

Bryan O'Donoghue bryano at europlex.ie
Wed May 5 12:51:00 IST 2004


> There is no need to compromise beyond that, we do not need to degrade
> trust. There is no reason why we cannot take the advantages of E-voting 
> (harder to mistakenly spoil a ballot, better accsessiblity) and combine
> it with what we know - paper counts.

A paper count is a step in the right direction.

However, in order to stress the Close Source system, one has to perform a paper 
count in tandem. At this point we can know or at least hazard a better guess as 
to the likelyhood of a backdoors existing in a given system.

Perhaps that backdoors exists, but, wasn't used in that particular instance to 
compromise the voting process.

My position would be that, unless I as a citizen can verify that code, I can't 
be satisfied that the system *isn't* compromised.

A paper trail is a necessity, but, I also would contend, so is the ability to 
scrutanise the source code.

Why shouldn't the source code be available to the public?

A foreign company has *no* rights afforded to citizens in this country, it is a 
vendor, supplying a public service and it's ethereal Intellectual Property 
rights, have no remit to degrade or abrogate a citizens right to verify *all* 
aspects of a democratic vote.

With aspects of the voting system performed behind closed doors, the ability 
for an new angle of deceit is introduced. This is a necessary area of paranoia 
and complacency in areas like this, have a tendency to bite one in the rear end 
with veracity.

What that is, is a retrograde step from the voter verification process we have 
now, and that's completely unacceptable.

-- 
Bryan O'Donoghue
Embedded Software Engineer

Europlex Technologies Ltd
Clonshaugh Business & Technology Park
Dublin 17
Ireland

T:+353 (0) 1 2500500
F:+353 (0) 1 2500590
E:bryano at euoplex.ie
W:www.europlex.ie




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